As part of the Wizkit project, Daniel Genkin of Stealth subcontractor University of Michigan and collaborators presented their findings “Prime+Probe 1, JavaScript 0: Overcoming Browser-based Side-Channel Defenses” on browser-based side-channel attacks at the 30th USENIX Security Symposium. Their work demonstrates the first browser-based side-channel attack which is constructed entirely from Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) and HTML, which works even when script execution is completely blocked. A link to the corresponding publication (in the conference proceedings) can be found here. Stealth consultant Jonathan Katz (University of Maryland) and Xiao Wang of Stealth subcontractor Northwestern University, together with collaborators, presented “Mystique: Efficient Conversions for Zero-Knowledge Proofs with Applications to Machine Learning” at the same conference, which can be found here.